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ABSTRACT
In the last years we have witnessed the appearance of a variety
of strategies to design optimal location privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms, in terms of maximizing the adversary’s expected error with
respect to the users’ whereabouts. In this work, we take a closer
look at the defenses created by these strategies and show that, even
though they are indeed optimal in terms of adversary’s correctness,
not all of them offer the same protection when looking at other
dimensions of privacy. To avoid “bad” choices, we argue that the
search for optimal mechanisms must be guided by complementary
criteria. We provide two example auxiliary metrics that help in
this regard: the conditional entropy, that captures an information-
theoretic aspect of the problem; and the worst-case quality loss,
that ensures that the output of the mechanism always provides a
minimum utility to the users. We describe a new mechanism that
maximizes the conditional entropy and is optimal in terms of aver-
age adversary error, and compare its performance with previously
proposed optimal mechanisms using two real datasets. Our empiri-
cal results confirm that no mechanism fares well on every privacy
criteria simultaneously, making apparent the need for considering
multiple privacy dimensions to have a good understanding of the
privacy protection a mechanism provides.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Privacy-preserving protocols; •Net-
works→ Location based services;
KEYWORDS
Location Privacy;MechanismDesign;MechanismEvaluation; Quan-
tifying Privacy
1 INTRODUCTION
Location based services raise important privacy concerns regard-
ing the private information that exposing accurate location to ser-
vice providers reveals [13, 14, 16, 20, 30]. To protect users’ privacy,
the academic community has proposed a wide variety of location
privacy-preserving mechanisms [3, 15, 17–19, 21, 23, 28, 29] that
mostly work altering the users’ actual location before exposing it
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to the service provider. The privacy evaluation of these proposals
typically does not consider a strategic adversary, fostering an arms
race in which defenses and attacks succeed each other without ever
providing clear location privacy guarantees. To counter this effect,
recent efforts focus on cutting the arms race short by either embed-
ding the adversarial knowledge on the design process [5, 24, 27], or
providing guarantees independent of the adversary’s prior [2, 5, 24].
In this paper, we focus on sporadic user-centric protectionmecha-
nisms based on randomization, which preserve privacy by reporting
a noisy version of the real location to the service provider according
to a probability distribution. These mechanisms are adequate for ap-
plications that require infrequent location exposure, and can be run
locally by the user. In this scenario, approaches that embed the ad-
versarial knowledge on the design process are based on a Bayesian
modeling of the adversary [26], and find optimal noise-generating
mechanisms via linear optimization in which a target privacy ob-
jective is sought in presence of utility constraints [27]. On the other
hand, approaches that provide privacy guarantees independent of
the adversary’s prior are based on geo-indistinguishability [2], an
adaptation of differential privacy [9] to two-dimensional spaces,
used by a number of works [11, 12, 22]. Geo-indindistinguishability
can be achieved optimally in terms of utility using expensive lin-
ear programming [5], or suboptimally using efficient remapping
techniques that increase the utility of the query [6]. Finally, the
Bayesian and the geo-indistinguishability approaches have been
combined by Shokri [24] to obtain mechanisms that guarantee geo-
indindistinguishability while achieving a good performance against
the Bayesian adversary.
Following the recommendation by Shokri et al. [26], which has
been taken as the standard by the community, all of these ap-
proaches use the adversary’s correctness, i.e., how close the ad-
versary’s estimate is to the correct answer, to evaluate location
privacy. Usually, the adversary’s correctness is measured as her
expected estimation error, where this error is modeled using some
distance metric between the real location and the adversary’s esti-
mation [25].
In this paper, we aim at understanding the properties of the
mechanisms output by these design strategies. We find that, when
the target privacy notion is the adversary’s expected estimation
error, there are many optimal mechanisms that meet a desired
quality loss constraint. While this may seem advantageous, we
show that following such an optimization objectivemay result in the
selection of naive mechanisms that obviously provide little privacy,
e.g., alternating the exposure of the actual user location and a far
away location. Indeed, this mechanism complies on average with
the constraints of the problem. Yet, it results on little uncertainty for
the adversary, effectively providing a false perception of privacy.
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To counter such effect we argue that, depending on the user’s
preferences, the search for an optimal location privacy-preserving
mechanism needs to consider more criteria than the error, contra-
dicting the belief established by Shokri et al. [26]. As examples of
complementary metrics to guide the design of protection mecha-
nisms we propose the use of information-theoretic metrics, e.g.,
the conditional entropy, or a worst-case bound for quality loss. We
provide efficient methods to construct mechanisms with respect to
these criteria, and demonstrate that the remapping method intro-
duced in [6] to improve the utility of geo-indistinguishability-based
methods is in fact a straightforward generic scheme to build an
optimal mechanism in terms of the expected estimation error from
any obfuscation mechanism. We evaluate the effectiveness of the
different mechanisms according to different privacy criteria using
two real location datasets concluding that, generally, mechanisms
that are optimal for one criterion do not necessarily perform well
on others.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
✓ We provide a theoretical characterization of optimal location
privacy-preserving mechanisms in terms of the mean adversarial
error. We show that, for a given average quality loss, there is more
than one optimal protection mechanism that maximizes the average
privacy. This family of mechanisms forms a convex polytope in
which different mechanisms provide different privacy guarantees.
✓ We demonstrate the limitations of evaluating defenses solely
considering the correctness of the adversary [26], and advocate
for the use of complementary criteria to guide the design of loca-
tion privacy-preserving mechanisms where the privacy guarantees
provided are better understood.
✓We provide algorithms to efficiently design mechanisms based on
criteria other than the adversary’s error. Furthermore, we demon-
strate that remapping, previously proposed as an enhancement to
geo-indistinguishability, is not only beneficial to improve the utility
of this technique but can be used as a generic method to turn any
obfuscation mechanism into optimal in terms of average adversarial
error.
✓We evaluate prior and new location privacy-preserving mech-
anisms on two real location datasets. Our results confirm that it
is difficult to find optimal mechanisms that fare well on all crite-
ria. This demonstrates that previous approaches to design location
privacy-preserving mechanisms, while having solid foundations,
oversimplify the design problem and generate defenses that overes-
timate the level of privacy offered to the user.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
system model, and the quality loss and privacy metrics we consider
in the paper. In Section 3 we study the consequences of choosing
the average adversary error as the standard metric to evaluate lo-
cation privacy, illustrating that mechanisms that are optimal by
this criterion may provide little privacy. In Section 4 we propose
to consider auxiliary metrics to avoid bad mechanism choices in
the optimization. As examples, we study the use of the conditional
entropy and the worst-case quality loss. We evaluate several mech-
anisms built according to these new criteria in Section 5, and offer
our conclusions in Section 6.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
We now describe our system model, which is in agreement with
the framework for location privacy proposed by Shokri et al. [26],
and introduce the notation used throughout the paper, which is
summarized in Table 1.
We consider a set of users that send queries with a geographical
position of interest to a location based service to obtain a service
(e.g., finding points of interest or nearby friends). The location of in-
terest can be the current location of the user or some other location
the user is interested in querying about. Users wish to obtain utility
from the location based service, while keeping their whereabouts
private from an adversary that can observe the locations in the
queries, e.g, an eavesdropper of the user-server communication, or
the service provider itself. In order to protect their locations, users
employ a location privacy-preserving mechanism that perturbs their
location prior to exposing it to the server. We consider a strategic
adversary that knows the protection mechanism operation, and
has some knowledge about the users movement patterns. Given
the observed perturbed location and her knowledge, the adversary
tries to infer the user real location.
We model the locations queried by the users as a discrete set
of points of interest denoted by X  {x1,x2, · · · ,xN }. We refer to
these locations as real or input locations since they are the actual
locations that are input to the location privacy-preserving mecha-
nism. We use π (x) to denote the prior probability that a user in the
population queries the service provider about location x (π (x) ≥ 0
and
∑
x ∈X π (x) = 1). This prior can either represent the global
behavior of all the users as in [6], or be tailored to a particular user,
but we assume that it is known both by the user and the adversary
and that it can be used to design the privacy-preserving mecha-
nism. We also consider independence between queries, i.e., that the
input locations x from the same or other users are samples form
i.i.d. random variables given by π .
The set of possible locations reported by the location privacy-
preserving mechanism is denoted byZ. We assume that users can
report any location in the worldZ = R2. We refer to these locations
as output locations, as they are the outputs of the privacy-preserving
mechanism. The mechanism itself is denoted by f and modeled as
a set of (continuous) conditional probability distributions, where
f (z |x) denotes the probability density function (pdf) of reporting
the output location z ∈ R2 when the real location of the user is
x ∈ X (note that f (z |x) ≥ 0 and
∫
R2 f (z |x)dz = 1 for all x ∈X). We represent discrete mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms with a
discrete output domain, in R2 with the Dirac delta function δ . For
example, the mechanism that maps any x ∈ X to two particular
outputs z1, z2 ∈ R2 with the same probability would be f (z |x) =
0.5δ (z − z1)+ 0.5δ (z − z2). For integration purposes, δ (z − z′) must
be understood as a two-dimensional Gaussian pdf centered at z′
whose variance is arbitrarily small.
When using a privacy-preservingmechanism f to obtain privacy,
the user experiences a loss on the quality of service due to the fact
that she reports a location that might not be the location of interest,
and may even be far away from this one. We use P(f ,π ) to denote
the privacy of the user, and Q(f ,π ) to denote her quality loss. We
specify particular instantiations of these functions below.
Table 1: Summary of notation
Symbol Meaning
x Input location the user is interested in querying about.
X Set of valid input locations or points of interest.
z Output location released by the mechanism, z ∈ R2.
xˆ Adversary’s estimation of the input location, xˆ ∈ R2.
π (x) Prior probability that a user wants to query about x .
f (z |x) Privacy mechanism. Pdf of z ∈ R2 given x ∈ X.
fZ (z) Pdf of z, i.e., fZ (z) = ∑x ∈X π (x) · f (z |x).
p(x |z) Posterior probability of x given z.
dQ (x , z) Quality loss distance function between x and z.
Q Average quality loss metric, in (1).
Q+ Worst-case quality loss metric, in (2).
dP (x , xˆ) Privacy distance function between x and xˆ .
PAE Average error privacy metric, in (5).
PCE Conditional entropy privacy metric, in (9)
PGI Geo-Indistinguishability privacy metric, in (11)
2.1 Quality Loss Metrics
We consider two possible definitions of quality loss: the average
loss, and the worst-case loss. To this end we introduce dQ (x , z), a
function that quantifies how much quality of service is lost by a
user reporting output location z when she is interested in input
location x . Larger values of dQ (x , z) indicate a larger loss, and there-
fore a worse utility performance for the user. The canonical choice
for this function is the Euclidean distance: dQ (x , z) = | |x − z | |2.
Note that dQ (·) does not need to be a metric in the mathematical
sense: it could be any function that maps an input location and a
released location to a loss value (e.g., a feeling-based utility metric
as in [1, 4]).
Average Loss. The average loss measures how much quality a user
loses on average, and can be written as:
Q(f ,π ) =
∑
x ∈X
∫
R2
π (x) · f (z |x) · dQ (x , z)dz . (1)
This metric has been the typical choice of utility in the related liter-
ature [2, 5–7, 27] since it is very intuitive. This metric also has the
advantage of being linear with the mechanism f , which is very use-
ful towards reducing the computational cost of mechanism design
algorithms. Moreover, it makes the analysis of optimal algorithms
in terms of average loss tractable.
Worst-case Loss. Given a function that quantifies the point-wise
loss as defined above, dQ (x , z), the worst-case loss is defined as:
Q+(f ,π ) = max
x,z
π (x )>0
f (z |x )>0
dQ (x , z) . (2)
The worst-case loss measures how much utility the user loses in
the worst case possible. For example, if dQ (x , z) is the Euclidean
distance and the user wants to query about x , a mechanism with
Q+(f ,π ) ≤ 2km ensures that the output z will not be further
than 2km away from x . This property is very helpful for many
applications that target nearby-type of services, since if the reported
location is very far from the desired location then the result of the
query would be generally useless for the user.
2.2 Privacy Metrics
We present now three notions of privacy: the average adversary
error, the conditional entropy of the posterior distribution, and
geo-indistinguishability.
Average Error. The average error is the de-facto standard to mea-
sure location privacy since Shokri et al. [26] argued that incorrect-
ness determines the privacy of users. Consider that the adversary
knows the prior π and the mechanism f chosen by the user. With
this information, she produces an estimate xˆ ∈ Xˆ of the user’s input
location x . The choice of Xˆ depends on the computational power
of the adversary. Since we assume that the user has the freedom to
report any location in R2, we also assume an unbounded adversary
that can estimate locations on the whole world Xˆ = R2. Upon
observing z, the adversary can build a posterior probability mass
function over the inputs, denoted as p(x |z):
p(x |z) = π (x) · f (z |x)∑
x ′∈X π (x ′) · f (z |x ′)
. (3)
Let dP (x , xˆ) be a function that quantifies the magnitude of the
adversary’s error when deciding that the input location was xˆ
when the input location is actually x . As in the case of the average
loss Q, this function dP (·) does not necessarily need to be a metric
(e.g., it can include the user sensitivity to an adversary learning
semantic information such as in [1]). Given an output location z,
the optimal decision for the adversary in terms of minimizing the
average error is
xˆ(z) = argmin
xˆ ∈R2
{∑
x ∈X
p(x |z) · dP (x , xˆ)
}
. (4)
The average adversary’s error, or just average error, is defined as
themean error incurred by an adversary that chooses the estimation
xˆ optimally given each observed z. Let fZ (z) = ∑x ∈X π (x) · f (z |x)
be the probability density function of z. Then, the average error is:
PAE(f ,π ) =
∫
R2
fZ (z)
∑
x ∈X
p(x |z) · dP (x , xˆ(z))dz (5)
=
∫
R2
min
xˆ ∈R2
{∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f (z |x) · dP (x , xˆ)
}
dz . (6)
Note that mechanisms designed with PAE inherently protect against
a strategic adversary, since the metric embeds the adversary’s esti-
mation. This metric has been used as part of the design objective
in previous works [26, 27], and as a way of comparing the per-
formance in terms of privacy of mechanisms designed with other
different privacy goals in mind [2, 5–7].
Conditional Entropy. The conditional entropy is an information-
theoretic metric that can be used to measure the adversary’s un-
certainty about the user’s real location when z is released. After
observing z, the adversary builds the posterior p(x |z) using (3). The
uncertainty of the adversary regarding the value of x given z can
be measured as the entropy of this posterior:
H (x |z)  −
∑
x ∈X
p(x |z) · log(p(x |z)) . (7)
The conditional entropy measures the average entropy of the pos-
terior after z is released. Formally,
PCE(f ,π ) =
∫
R2
fZ (z) · H (x |z)dz , (8)
where fZ (z) is the probability density function of z, and H (x |z) is
a function of z as defined in (7). Alternatively, using only the prior
π and the mechanism f , the conditional entropy can be written as
PCE(f ,π ) = −
∑
x ∈X
∫
R2
π (x)·f (z |x)·log
(
π (x) · f (z |x)∑
x ′∈X π (x ′) · f (z |x ′)
)
dz .
(9)
Note that this metric does not depend on the geography of the
problem, i.e., on the particular values of x or z. If we use the base-
two logarithm in the formula, then PCE can be interpreted as how
many bits of information the adversary needs on average to com-
pletely identify x . This metric was disregarded as a possible privacy
metric in [26] due to being uncorrelated with the average error. In
this work, we challenge such conclusion showing that considering
solely the correctness of the adversary may lead to the design of
mechanisms that offer low privacy. We show in Section 4 how using
the conditional entropy as a complementary privacy metric helps
to avoid choosing those undesirable mechanisms.
Geo-Indistinguishability. Geo-indistinguishability is an exten-
sion of the concept of differential privacy, originally a notion of
privacy in databases, to the location privacy scenario. It was origi-
nally proposed in [2] and other works have continued the research
on this line [5–7]. Formally, ϵ-geo-indistinguishability requires the
following condition to be fulfilled by a location privacy-preserving
mechanism f ,∫
A
f (z |x)dz ≤ eϵ ·dP (x,x ′) ·
∫
A
f (z |x ′)dz , ∀x ,x ′ ∈ X ,∀A ⊆ R2 .
(10)
This requirement ensures that given an areaA ⊆ R2, the probability
of reporting a point z in that area if the original location was x over
any other location x ′ within some distance around x , is similar, and
therefore x and x ′ have some degree of statistical indistinguisha-
bility. In this definition, dP (x ,x ′) is a function that quantifies how
indistinguishable x and x ′ are: smaller values of dP (x ,x ′) indicate
a higher indistinguishability, as the constraint becomes tighter. The
privacy parameter in this definition is ϵ : larger values of ϵ indicate a
looser constraint that allows f (z |x) and f (z |x ′) to be more different,
and therefore x and x ′ become more distinguishable. Smaller values
of ϵ force the probability density functions f (z |x) and f (z |x ′) to
be closer, providing more privacy. Note that, if for a single input
location x there is a positive probability of reporting the output in a
region A ⊆ R2,
∫
A f (z |x)dz > 0, then that must also be true for ev-
ery other input location x ′. Also, note that geo-indistinguishability
is independent of the prior π .
The typical choice of dP (x ,x ′) in geo-indistinguishability is the
Euclidean distance [2, 5]. Many geo-indistinguishability mecha-
nisms rely on the fact that dP (x ,x ′) is a metric (specifically, in the
fact that it satisfies the triangular inequality dP (x ,x ′) ≤ dP (x , z) +
dP (x ′, z)) to prove that they meet the condition in (10).
Although geo-indistinguishability is generally considered a pri-
vacy guarantee and not itself a metric, we can adapt it to represent
an equivalent concept to our generic metric P(f ,π ). Given a mech-
anism that provides ϵ-geo-indistinguishability, it is straightforward
to see that it is also ϵ ′-geo-indistinguishable if ϵ ′ > ϵ . Since a
smaller ϵ denotes more privacy, it makes sense to define the geo-
indistinguishability level provided by a mechanism f according to
the smallest ϵ it guarantees. Also, since we are defining P(f ,π ) as a
magnitude that grows with the protection of the users, we choose
to define our measure of geo-indistinguishability, PGI(f ), as the
inverse of the smallest ϵ guaranteed by the mechanism. Given the
mechanism f , we write
PGI(f ) = inf
x,x ′∈X
z∈R2
dP (x ,x ′) ·
log f (z |x)f (z |x ′) −1 , (11)
wherewe assume by convention that log( 00 ) = 0 and thatdP (x ,x ′) =| |x − x ′ | |2 is the Euclidean distance. Larger values of PGI indicate
more privacy, and themechanism guarantees 1/PGI-geo-indistingui-
shability.
3 LIMITATIONS OF THE EXPECTED
ADVERSARY ERROR BASED EVALUATION
The most standard way to assess the location privacy provided by
two mechanisms has been the evaluation of the trade-off between
their average adversary error PAE and their average loss Q. The use
of the average error as yardstick for location privacy was proposed
in [26] under the general notion of correctness, and its use as a way
of comparing mechanisms was followed by many of the subsequent
works [1, 2, 5–7, 27]. The choice of distance functions dP (·) and
dQ (·) for both the average error and the average loss in these works
is mostly the Euclidean distance [1, 2, 5, 6, 27] although some of
them also consider the Hamming distance [5, 26, 27] or semantic
distances for privacy [1, 7].
In this section, we show the problems that stem from this estab-
lished 2-dimensional evaluation approach. We start by studying the
properties of mechanisms that are optimal according to these two
metrics. Then, we introduce a new mechanism that we call the coin
mechanism, and use it as an example that brings to light the flaws
of judging the privacy of a mechanism by its performance in terms
of average error and average loss.
3.1 Study of the Established Mechanism
Evaluation
We start our analysis by assuming that the choice of distance func-
tions dP (·) and dQ (·) is the same for simplicity, which is a typical
choice in related works (e.g., both are the Euclidean distance). We
denote this by dP (·) ≡ dQ (·). At the end of the section, we argue
what happens when this is not the case. We also introduce two def-
initions. First, let FQ be the set of all the mechanisms that achieve
an average loss smaller or equal than Q. Formally,
FQ 
{
f |Q(f ,π ) ≤ Q
}
. (12)
Also, let F optQ ⊆ FQ be the set of all mechanisms f ∈ FQ that are
optimal in terms of average adversary error, i.e.,
F optQ 
{
f | f ∈ FQ , PAE(f ,π ) ≥ PAE(f ′,π ) ∀f ′ ∈ FQ
}
. (13)
We call a mechanism inside F optQ optimal, since it achieves as much
privacy as possible among all the mechanisms with the same quality
loss. We state the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. The set of optimal mechanisms with respect to the
average privacy PAE and the average loss Q is a convex polytope.
Proof. Let the privacy achieved by any mechanism in F optQ be
Popt(Q). Then, we can define this set as
F optQ = { f | PAE(f ,π ) = Popt(Q), Q(f ,π ) ≤ Q} , (14)
and since PAE(f ,π ) and Q(f ,π ) are linear operations with f , (14)
can be written as an intersection of half-spaces, which forms a
convex polytope. □
Note that the proof also applies to the case where dP (·) .
dQ (·) (e.g., privacy as the average Hamming error of the adver-
sary and quality loss as the average Manhattan distance). The
same outcome can be derived for the conditional entropy and geo-
indistinguishability, althoughwe leave those results out of the scope
of this work.
This lemma shows that there is a family of optimal mechanisms
that lie inside a convex polytope, instead of just a single mechanism.
All of them provide the same (maximal) privacy for the same quality
loss constraint so, in principle, they are equally useful. In what
follows, we show why this is not the case.
We start by introducing the concept of remapping. A remapping
д is a function д : R2 → R2 that maps an output z ∈ R2 to another
output z′ ∈ R2 according to the probability density function д(z′ |z).
It is well known that if we generate a mechanism f ′ = f ◦ д =∫
R2 д(z′ |z) · f (z |x)dz, then the privacy of f ′ in terms of average
error, conditional entropy or geo-indistinguishability is not smaller
than that of f . This is reasonable, as the remappingд is independent
from x , and thus it does not reveal any information about it. The
optimal Bayesian remapping is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Optimal remapping). Given a mechanism f , its
optimal remapping is the one that minimizes the average loss of
the composition f ′ = f ◦ д, i.e., д(z′ |z) = δ (z′ − r (z)), where
r (z) = argmin
z′∈R2
∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f (z |x) · dQ (x , z′) . (15)
This remapping assigns each location z to the location r (z) in
(15), and is used in [6] as a way of improving the utility of geo-
indistinguishability mechanisms. Now, we show that it can also
be used not only to reduce the quality loss of mechanisms but to
achieve optimal mechanisms in terms of average error privacy:
Theorem 3.3. Let д be an optimal remapping for mechanism f ,
and let f ′ be the composition f ′ = f ◦ д. If dP (·) ≡ dQ (·), then f ′ is
an optimal mechanism, i.e., f ′ ∈ F opt
Q(f ′,π ).
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
This theorem provides a straightforward way of building an
optimal mechanism f ′ from any mechanism f . The idea is to reas-
sign each output z of f to another symbol z′ such that the average
quality loss is minimized. Doing this for every output ensures that
the quality loss cannot be further reduced, and since the distance
function used to evaluate quality loss and privacy is the same, the
best estimation the adversary can do of x is just to keep the re-
leased value. Note that the Q(f ′,π ) ≤ Q(f ,π ). This means that,
in order to find an optimal mechanism f ′ for a target quality loss
Q(f ′,π ) = Q using the remapping strategy, one has to adjust the
loss of the mechanism f (e.g., by tuning its variance if it is a noise
mechanism) until f ′ achieves the desired average loss Q.
It is straightforward to see that, if the optimal remapping for a
mechanism f is just doing nothing, then it means f is optimal:
Corollary 3.4. If the optimal remapping in (15) for a mechanism
f is д(z′ |z) = δ (z′ − z), then f is optimal for its quality loss Q, i.e.,
f ∈ F optQ .
This is a very convenient way of proving the optimality of a
mechanism when dP (·) ≡ dQ (·). Another way of seeing that such
mechanism is optimal, is by realizing that with this choice of met-
rics, the privacy is upper bounded by the quality loss PAE(f ,π ) ≤
Q(f ,π ), and the upper bound is indeed achieved when an optimal
mechanism is used. We note that the fact that PAE(f ,π ) = Q(f ,π )
for optimal mechanisms is not new, as it was already mentioned in
[2] about the mechanisms in [27].
3.2 The Coin Mechanism and the Flaws of the
Traditional Approach
We now discuss the following mechanism, which we call the coin
mechanism, and prove that it is optimal. Let z∗ be the output location
that minimizes the average quality loss of a mechanism that always
reports that location regardless of the input x . Formally,
z∗  argmin
z∈R2
∑
x ∈X
π (x) · dQ (x , z) . (16)
As an example, if we measure the point-to-point loss as the mean
squared errordQ (x , z) = | |x−z | |22 , then z∗ will be given by the mean
z∗ = ∑x ∈X π (x)·x . If the loss is measured as the Euclidean distance,
then z∗ is the geometric median of π . Given a generic distance
function dQ (·), the optimal output location z∗ can be computed by
solving the optimization problem in (16).
Let Q∗ be the average quality loss achieved by a mechanism
that always reports z∗ regardless of the input. We construct the
following mechanism, which we denote fcoin. First, we fix a desired
quality loss Q ≤ Q∗ and compute α  1 − Q/Q∗. Then, we build
fcoin(z |x) = α · δ (z − x) + (1 − α) · δ (z − z∗) , (17)
where z∗ is in (16). This mechanism can be easily explained and
implemented simulating a coin flip. We first set our desired quality
loss Q ≤ Q∗. Note that it would not make sense to fix Q to a value
larger than Q∗ since we would not achieve more privacy by doing
so; a mechanism that always reports z∗ and has an average loss
of Q∗ yields the highest privacy allowed by π . Then, we compute
α = 1−Q/Q∗ and set it as the probability that our coin shows heads.
Assume we are interested in querying about a location x ∈ X, so
we flip the coin. If the coin shows heads, then we report our desired
location z = x . If the coin hits tails, then we report z∗ regardless
of the value of x . It is easy to see that the average loss of (17) is
indeed Q, by the linearity of this metric with f .
Proposition 3.5. The coin mechanism obtained for quality loss
Q achieves the maximum average adversarial error possible given a
constraint on the average quality loss, i.e., fcoin(Q) ∈ F optQ , if both
are measured with the same distance function dP (·) ≡ dQ (·).
The proof is straightforward using the result in Corollary 3.4.
We now reason why, even though the coin mechanism is optimal
by the standards that have been used to evaluate privacy in prior
works (i.e., PAE and Q), this mechanism is hardly desirable for any
user. When the coin shows heads, the adversary observes z. If
z , z∗, the adversary knows for sure that the user was interested
in querying about x = z and therefore the user has no privacy
at all. In this case, for privacy issues, there was no point in using
the mechanism. When the coin shows tails, the user is mapped
far away to z∗. The adversary observes z∗ and has no idea where
the user is, besides the prior π that was already known by her. In
this case, the privacy of the user is maximal, but the quality loss is
very large, since z∗ is almost always very far away from the user.
The quality loss is so large that the utility the user gets from this
realization of the mechanism can be considered zero, so we can
say that there was no point in using the mechanism in this case
either. We have reached the issue we mentioned earlier: there is a
mechanism, optimal by classic location privacy standards [26], that
is useless both from the privacy and the quality loss point of view.
This shows that there is a fundamental problem with the classic
way that has been used to evaluate location privacy mechanisms.
3.3 The reach of this problem
One could think that the problem of this bi-dimensional evaluation
approach lies on the fact that one cannot use the same metric
to measure quality loss and privacy, e.g., the Euclidean distance.
However, even with different metrics, mechanisms similar to the
coin can be derived. For example, if privacy is the average mean
squared error and quality loss is measured as the averageManhattan
distance (i.e., the l1 norm), a deterministic mechanism that consists
on reporting the real location on most of the places and mapping to
the other side of the Earth in some others is optimal, due to the fact
that the MSE grows quadratically with the distance, while the l1
(or any lp norm) does not. In our evaluation, we show an example
where a mechanism optimized for PAE and Q with a different pair
of distance functions dP (·) , dQ (·) suffers from the coin issue. The
problem does not arise from the particular distance functions dP (·)
and dQ (·) one uses to evaluate the average error and loss, but from
the fact that these metrics are averages, and as such they do not
restrict the minimum privacy of a single use of the mechanism or
the maximum quality loss of the mechanism, they just ensure that
the average is good. We believe that, while evaluating the average
behavior of a mechanism is not an erroneous notion per-se, it must
be handled with care to avoid undesirable results, such as the coin
mechanism.
As a concluding remark, we would like to note that we have
shown this problem assuming that the outputs of the mechanism
and the values estimated by the adversary are points in R2, for
notational simplicity and generality. An important fraction of pre-
vious works [1, 5, 7, 26, 27] assume a discrete model where the set
of output valuesZ and estimated values Xˆ are the centers of a grid
over the map or points of interest such asX. In these scenarios, one
can derive a similar mechanism, where hitting tails means that the
user reports the location out of the allowed ones that minimizes
the average error. That mechanism can also be shown to be optimal
in terms of average error and loss, although it is not a desirable
mechanism for any user. For completeness, we also evaluate this
scenario in our experiments. The same applies to the case where
instead of having discrete input locations X, users can report any
point in R2 (for example, a tracking or a date finder application).
The coin mechanism in (17) can be applied directly to this scenario,
and it can be shown to be optimal (changing the summations over
X to integrals). It is clear that using the traditional evaluation ap-
proach has flaws in all these scenarios and we must find a solution
to this.
4 COMPLEMENTARY MECHANISM
EVALUATION CRITERIA
So far we have seen that evaluating mechanisms based solely on the
average error and quality loss does not reflect whether a mechanism
is actually more beneficial than another one, due to the fact that
some undesirable mechanisms are deemed optimal by this approach.
In this section, we propose a solution to this evaluation procedure
that consists in incorporating complementary evaluation criteria
that add different perspectives to the performance of a mechanism
in terms of privacy and quality loss.
We propose two metrics, that are not intended to be used as a re-
placement of the average error and average loss but in combination
with them, adding new dimensions to the privacy vs. quality loss
trade-off. The first metric we propose is the conditional entropy, a
privacy metric that helps detecting inconsistent mechanisms such
as the coin. The second one is the worst-case loss, a quality loss
metric that provides a way of staying out of mechanisms that might
yield no utility for the user at all. We comment on the implemen-
tation of mechanisms that take these metrics into consideration,
and propose a mechanism that maximizes the conditional entropy
while being optimal in terms of average error and quality loss. We
finish the section describing other alternative privacy metrics.
4.1 The Conditional Entropy as a
Complementary Metric
4.1.1 Usefulness of the Conditional Entropy. One of the prob-
lems of the coin mechanism can be seen from an information-
theoretic point of view. The coin is a binary mechanism, in the
sense that each input location can only be mapped to itself or to
a fixed point in the map. From the adversary’s perspective, this
means that if the coin shows heads the adversary has no uncer-
tainty at all about the user’s input location, and if it shows tails
the uncertainty is maximal. The conditional entropy can be used
to detect these scenarios where the adversary has no uncertainty
about x . Recalling (8), the conditional entropy can be written as
PCE(f ,π ) =
∫
R2
fZ (z) · H (x |z)dz , (18)
where H (x |z)  −∑x ∈X p(x |z) · log(p(x |z)) is the entropy of the
posterior after a location z is released. It is clear that (18) is an
average over the entropy of all the posteriors. However, contrary
to the average error, the conditional entropy is an average over
functions H (z |x) that are strictly concave with f . This means that
in order to perform well in terms of the conditional entropy, a
mechanism must spread its uncertainty among every posterior
p(x |z) instead of achieving maximal uncertainty with some outputs
and zero uncertainty with others, as the coin does.
Another interesting property of the entropy is that it is not a
geographical metric. The entropy of a posterior H (x |z) does not
depend on the coordinates of the input locations or the semantic
information tied to them (e.g., if the location is a hospital or a
club). The entropy only depends on how evenly the posterior is
distributed among the input locations. This probabilistic aspect of
privacy, defined as uncertainty in [26], cannot be captured by other
privacy notions such as correctness (e.g., the average adversary
error). Due to the geographic nature of the location privacy problem,
we cannot judge a mechanism based solely on its entropy. However,
using it as an additional dimension of privacy gives a more complete
picture of the performance of a mechanism.
We would like to point out that this notion of uncertainty pro-
vided by the entropy was disregarded as a reasonable privacy metric
in [26] based on the fact that, since it is not correlated with the
adversary error, it does not capture how hard is for the adversary
to estimate the real input location. We claim that it is indeed the
fact that the entropy is not correlated with the adversary error
which gives it a special value as a complementary metric of privacy.
The same way that semantic location privacy metrics have been
proposed together with geographic metrics [1, 7] to give different
perspectives on the problem, the conditional entropy is a tool that
gives valuable information about the protection provided by the
mechanism not captured by the average error.
We would like to make two remarks regarding the entropy. First,
the conditional entropy PCE(f ,π ) must be taken into account to-
gether with the mutual information I (X ;Z ) to get a full picture of
the information-theoretic properties of the mechanism. The condi-
tional entropy represents the average amount of uncertainty the
adversary has about the real location x after observing z. A small
value of conditional entropy indicates low uncertainty, and there-
fore we might get the impression that a mechanism with such small
value provides low privacy. However, it might have been possible
that the entropy of the prior was already low, and therefore even if
the mechanism was perfect from the privacy point of view (i.e. it
did not reveal any information, I (X ;Z ) = 0), there is nothing any
mechanism could have done to avoid having a low conditional en-
tropy. We must therefore take into account the mutual information
or, equivalently, the entropy of the prior π , when interpreting the
value given by the conditional entropy.
The second remark is that the conditional entropy must not be
tailored to a particular adversary with a possibly wrong knowledge
of the prior π . In this work, we have assumed that the prior π
models the choice of input locations by the users, and therefore the
correct way of computing the entropy is by using π in the formulas
above. This entropy must be regarded as the uncertainty that a very
strong passive adversary with full knowledge of the behavior of
the users would have when observing z.
4.1.2 Implementation of Mechanisms with large Conditional En-
tropy. We now look for a mechanism that is optimal in terms of the
average error and average loss, i.e., a mechanism in F optQ , that also
achieves as much conditional entropy as possible. This problem
is equivalent to the rate-distortion problem [8] of finding a pdf
f (z |x) that minimizes the mutual information between x and z
subject to a quality loss constraint, which can be solved iteratively
by implementing the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm. For this, we must
first restrict our output to a discrete alphabetZ for computational
reasons. The more points we assign to this alphabet and the more
evenly we cover the space where we want to compute the mech-
anism with them, the better its performance will be. Since both
the input and output domains are discrete, the mechanism is de-
termined by the probabilities of reporting z when the user is in x ,
that we denote by p(z |x) here for clarity. We start with an initial
mechanism, for example uniform mapping p(z |x) = 1/|Z|. Then,
we perform the following steps:
(1) We compute the probability mass function of each the output:
PZ (z) =
∑
x ∈X
π (x) · p(z |x) , ∀z ∈ Z . (19)
(2) We update the mechanism as follows:
p(z |x) = PZ (z) · e−b ·dQ (x,z) , ∀x ∈ X, z ∈ Z. (20)
(3) We normalize the mechanism:
p(z |x) = p(z |x)∑
z′∈Z p(z′ |x)
, ∀x ∈ X, z ∈ Z. (21)
We skip this step for the outputs z with PZ (z) = 0.
(4) We repeat these steps until the change in the probabilities
p(z |x) is below some threshold.
The value of b in the second step needs to be tuned to change the
quality loss of the mechanism Q(f ,π ) and cannot be pre-computed
to achieve an exact value of average loss. Larger values of b yield
mechanisms with less quality loss, and therefore less average error
privacy and less conditional entropy. Finally, we obtain our mech-
anism f (z |x) by applying the optimal remapping to the discrete
mechanism defined in X → Z by the probabilities p(z |x). This
ensures that the resulting mechanism is optimal from the adversary
error privacy point of view.
We make two remarks regarding this algorithm. The first one
is about its computational cost. The operations in the three steps
above are not expensive as they only include multiplications and
additions. The number of elements we need to compute in order
to build p(z |x) is N  |X| · |Z|. The first step above consists of
N products and additions. In the second step e−b ·dQ (x,z) can be
precomputed as b, X andZ do not change during the algorithm, so
we only have to make N multiplications, and in the third step we
compute |X| values of∑z′∈Z p(z′ |x) and then perform N divisions.
It is clear then that the cost grows with the sizes of X and Z.
However, the algorithm only needs to be computed once for all the
users, which can be done in the cloud, and even if the prior π varies
we can use a previously computed algorithm as initialization of the
iteration above to get a fast update of the mechanism.
The second remark is that the mechanism produced by this
algorithm also satisfies 2b-geo-indistinguishability (the proof is
in the Appendix). This is a byproduct property that was not part
of the reasoning behind the algorithm and it does not imply that
the conditional entropy and geo-indistinguishability are related.
In fact, these are fundamentally different notions: the former is an
average metric that only considers the probabilistic (and not the
geographic) aspect of the problem, while the latter is a worst-case
metric that also considers the geography of the problem. Also, if
we truncate the optimal conditional entropy mechanism, we obtain
a mechanism that is almost optimal in terms of conditional entropy
but does not provide any level of geo-indistinguishability.
We evaluate this mechanism and others with respect to the
conditional entropy and the traditional metrics in Section 5.
4.2 The Worst-Case Quality Loss as a
Complementary Metric
4.2.1 Usefulness of theWorst-CaseQuality Loss. After analyzing
the privacy problems of the coin mechanism, we now turn to the
utility point of view. The great drawback of the coin mechanism
from the quality loss perspective is that if the coin shows tails then
the server’s response to the user’s query will most likely be useless
due to the great quality loss incurred by reporting z∗. We can think
of many applications where, if the Euclidean distance between x
and z is larger than a certain value, the user gets literally nothing
from the server response. For example, if we are close to a point of
interest x and we want to find a nearby hospital, querying about
a location z in another city will likely return a useless response
from the server. In that case, we could think of generating another
output and query the server again because we did not get what
we were hoping for. By doing so, the privacy properties of the
mechanism change, and in the case of the coin it is equivalent to
always revealing our true location.
A solution to this utility issue consists in imposing a worst-case
quality loss constraint on the mechanism, i.e.,
Q+(f ,π ) = max
x,z
π (x )>0
f (z |x )>0
dQ (x , z) ≤ Q+max . (22)
To put it simply, wewant amechanism that releases output locations
within Q+max from the input location, i.e., a bounded mechanism. The
upper bound Q+max would be tuned depending on the application in
question, so that a user never gets a worthless result. When used
together with the average error and the average loss, the worst-
case loss metric reveals those mechanisms we might want to avoid
using. It is easy to see that the coin mechanism, although optimal in
terms of PAE and Q, gives a very large value of Q+(fcoin,π ), which
manifests its uselessness.
An interesting consequence of setting a maximum worst-case
quality loss constraint when designing a mechanism is that it can
simplify the computational cost of the protocol that implements
or computes it. For example, take the case of the works in [5, 27],
where authors assume a discrete set of output locations Z and
propose to solve a linear program to find an optimal mechanism (in
terms of average error and geo-indistinguishability, respectively).
The constraint in (22) reduces the amount of variables that need
to be computed in these programs (only a subset ofZ are possible
outputs for each input x ∈ X), as well as the amount of constraints,
which in turn decreases drastically the computational cost of the
problem. In other implementations of mechanisms, where f is not
explicitly derived but computed by adding (continuous) noise and
then computing a remapping using the posterior (c.f. [6]), having a
worst-case quality loss constraint reduces the amount of inputs that
need to be considered when computing the posterior, effectively
reducing the computational cost of the algorithm.
Finally, we would like to note that this metric exposes a basic
problem with geo-indistinguishability mechanisms. As mentioned
before, when using a geo-indistinguishability mechanism, if a user
with input location x has non-zero probability of reporting z ∈ A ⊆
R2, then when the input location is any other x ′ ∈ X she must
assign a non-zero probability to reporting z ∈ A. This means that for
any geo-indistinguishable mechanism f , the worst-case quality loss
metric Q+(f ,π ) gives a huge value and the probability of getting a
useless response from the server would be larger than zero. One
could argue that, given the nature of the geo-indistinguishability
guarantee, the probability of reporting a location z far from x is
low and decreases exponentially with the distance between them,
so we could disregard such an event from happening. However, if
we really truncate the mechanism to ensure that the probability of
going very far is zero, then the mechanism does not provide any
geo-indistinguishability guarantee at all. It is then clear that geo-
indistinguishability mechanisms are problematic from the quality
loss point of view, and if a user gets zero utility from a realization
of the mechanism she cannot re-use it immediately, otherwise the
privacy guarantee is violated. We comment on a possible solution
to this problem below.
4.2.2 Implementation of Mechanisms with Worst-Case Quality
Loss Constraint. Nowwe set the task of designing a mechanism that
achieves a good value of worst-case quality loss or, alternatively,
that ensures that the worst-case quality loss is below some bound
Q+(f ,π ) ≤ Q+max. The straightforward approach, given a mecha-
nism f , is to truncate the mechanism (for example, by generating
samples of z until one of them ensures that dQ (x , z) ≤ Q+max, and
then releasing that z). This approach is reasonable, but one must
take into account that the privacy properties of this new truncated
mechanism f ′ are not the same as the original mechanism f , and
therefore they must be re-evaluated.
Another issue that concerns the design of bounded mechanisms
is that a deterministic remapping (15) might violate a Q+ constraint
(i.e., even if f guarantees the Q+ constraint, a composition f ′ =
f ◦ д might not guarantee it). Finding a bounded mechanism that
achieves as much privacy as an unbounded one in F optQ can be
an impossible task, due to the fact that the polytope defined by
Q+(f ,π ) ≤ Q+max might be disjoint withF optQ . However, we can lose
some privacy with respect to an optimal unbounded mechanism in
exchange for a better worst-case quality loss guarantee by enforcing
the bounding constraint Q+(f ,π ) ≤ Q+max.
4.3 Other Complementary Metrics
Now, we finally outline other metrics that can be used together
with the average error and average quality loss to assess the privacy
of mechanisms, and leave the development of mechanisms taking
them into account as subject for future work.
Geo-indistinguishability (10) inherently ensures that an input
locationx is mapped to a nearby locationwithmore probability than
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Figure 1: Two mechanisms that perform equally in the PAE
vs. Q plane, might behave very differently in practice. This
is revealed by considering amulti-dimensional characteriza-
tion of privacy.
to a far location, which solves the privacy issue we illustrated with
the coin mechanism. However, this privacy notion is not compatible
with a worst-case quality loss constraint by definition, due to the
fact that f (z |x) > 0 implies f (z |x ′) > 0, ∀x ′ ∈ X. A possible
approach to solve this utility issue of geo-indistinguishability can
be to relax its definition, allowing a small tolerance value ∆ ≪ 1,
i.e.,∫
A
f (z |x)dz ≤ eϵ ·dP (x,x ′) ·
∫
A
f (z |x ′)dz+∆ ,
∀x ,x ′ ∈ X ,
∀A ⊆ R2 . (23)
Other interestingmetrics to assess the privacy of mechanisms are
those based on the worst-case output. For example, the worst-case
output average error, defined as
PWC-AE(f ,π ) = min
z∈R2
fZ (z)>0
min
xˆ ∈R2
{∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f (z |x) · dP (x , xˆ)
}
, (24)
measures the average error of the adversary’s estimation in the
most vulnerable output. When applied to the coin mechanism, this
metric would reveal its privacy issue, since PWC-AE(fcoin,π ) = 0.
On the other hand, the worst-case output conditional entropy,
defined as
PWC-CE(f ,π ) = min
z∈R2
fZ (z)>0
∑
x ∈X
p(x |z) · logp(x |z) , (25)
reveals the uncertainty the adversary has after observing z in the
worst case (for the user). If there is any output value z that leaks
a lot of information about the real location x (as it happens with
every z , z∗ in the coin mechanism), this metric highlights it.
The metrics introduced throughout this section add additional
dimensions to the privacy and quality loss evaluation procedure,
revealing features not captured by the standard 2-dimensional ap-
proach based on the average error and the average loss. An example
of this new characterization of privacy is shown in Fig. 1 where
we show the performance of two mechanisms as a 3-D plot of PAE,
PCE and Q, together with the projections in the PAE-Q and PCE-
Q planes. In the next section, we show similar examples (albeit
with 2-dimensional plots, for clarity) of particular location privacy
preserving mechanisms.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we assess the performance of different location
privacy-preserving mechanisms with respect to different privacy
notions. Our experiments confirm that relying on a single metric
for evaluation can lead to an erroneous assessment of the privacy
provided by a mechanism. We divide our evaluation into two parts.
First, we consider the continuous scenario introduced in Section 2
and use real datasets to evaluate the performance of unbounded
mechanisms, and of mechanisms that guarantee a maximum worst-
case quality loss. Second, we consider a simpler scenario where
the locations can only belong to a discrete set, and evaluate other
defenses that have been proposed in the literature. All our experi-
ments are performed using Matlab.1
5.1 Continuous Scenario
For this part of the evaluation, we consider that users are interested
in querying about Points of Interest (PoIs) in a discrete set but
they can report any point in R2 to the server (see Section 2). We
also consider that the adversary performs her estimation in R2. We
build the set of PoIs using the Gowalla2 and Brightkite3 real-world
datasets. Following the approach of the finite domain evaluation
in [6], we restrict the PoIs to a finite region of San Francisco area
between the latitude coordinates (37.5395 and 37.7910) and longi-
tude (−122.5153 and −122.3789). We choose the San Francisco area
because it contains a big density of points of interest and a large
number of user check-ins, which ensures that the data is rich and
representative of what one would expect from users living in the
area. On the other hand, considering a finite region allows us to
evaluate mechanisms whose computational cost increases with the
number of points of interest, such as the exponential and exponen-
tial posterior mechanisms. We transform the PoIs into Cartesian
coordinates in kilometers using the Haversine formula with respect
to the center of the region. We end up with |X| = 9 701 PoIs for
Gowalla and |X| = 8 898 for Brightkite, distributed in an area of
roughly 28km × 12km. As example, the distribution of PoIs for
Gowalla is shown in Fig. 2. For each dataset, we compute the prior
π by counting how many users check-in on each point of interest
and normalizing the resulting histogram. The obtained priors are
shown in Fig. 3. We see that, in both datasets, there is a single
point of interest xtop that draws a lot of attention from the users
(π (xtop) ≈ 0.04 in Gowalla and π (xtop) ≈ 0.23 in Brightkite).
We evaluate six location-privacy preserving mechanisms, mea-
suring their performance in terms of the average adversary error
(PAE), conditional entropy (PCE) and geo-indistinguishability (PGI)
for different values of average quality loss (Q). We always use the
Euclidean distance for the quality loss dQ (x , z) = | |x − z | |2, and
therefore the optimal remapping in (15) is obtained by computing
the geometric median of the posterior. We compute this median
using Weiszfeld’s iterative method. We first evaluate the mecha-
nisms without any bounds on their worst-case quality loss, and
then imposing such constraint.
The first three mechanisms we evaluate consist in adding noise
in the continuous plane and then remapping them. We generate
1https://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab.html
2https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html
3https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-brightkite.html
Figure 2: Points of interest in the
San Francisco region taken from
Gowalla dataset.
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Figure 4: Conditional entropy vs. average quality loss for Gowalla (left) and Brightkite
(right) datasets.
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Figure 5: Geo-Ind Privacy PGI vs. average quality loss for Gowalla (left) and Brightkite
(right) datasets.
this noise in polar coordinates, sampling θ from a uniform distribu-
tion in (0, 2π ) and the radius r from a distribution specified below.
Since for these algorithms we cannot find a closed form expression
for f (z |x), we evaluate them empirically. To this end we sample
π to obtain x , we obtain z adding the noise and performing the
remapping, and then we measure privacy according to each metric.
We report averages over 5 000 repetitions. These mechanisms are:
• [Lap] Planar Laplacian noise plus remapping [6]. To gen-
erate the radius of the Laplace noise, we first sample p uni-
formly in the interval (0, 1). Then, following [2], we set
r = 1ϵ
(
W−1
(
p−1
e
)
+ 1
)
whereW−1 is the −1 branch of the
Lambert W function. We test different values of ϵ from
0.4km−1 to 40km−1, so that the average loss varies between
0.05 and 5km.
• [Gau] Bi-dimensional Gaussian noise plus remapping.
To generate Gaussian noise, we sample the radius from a
Rayleigh distribution, varying its mean from 0.05 to 5km.
• [Cir] Uniform circular noise plus remapping. In this case,
we sample the radius r ∈ (0,R) from f (r ) = r/R2, where R
is the maximum radius of the circle, which we vary from
0.075km to 7.5km. This ensures an average loss that varies
between 0.05 and 5km.
Second, we evaluate three mechanisms that output values in a
discrete set, whose conditional probability density functions f (z |x)
can be computed arithmetically. This allows us to exactly determine
their privacy and quality loss performance. These mechanisms are:
• [Coin] The coin mechanism, explained in Sect. 3.2. We
vary its average loss Q from 0 to 2.
• [Exp] The Exponential mechanism plus optimal remap-
ping. The exponential mechanism is a general differential
privacy technique that can be applied to provide geo-indistin-
guishability [10]. We set Z = X and set a parameter b,
then compute the probability of mapping each input x to
an output z as p(z |x) = a · e−b ·dQ (x,z), where a ensures
that
∑
z∈Z p(z |x) = 1. Then, we apply an optimal remap-
ping to the outputs of this function and obtain f (z |x). In the
experiments, we vary b from 0.4km−1 and 40km−1.
• [ExPost] Exponential posterior mechanism, proposed
in Section 4.1.2. In our experiments we set the discrete output
alphabet of this algorithm toZ = X.
5.1.1 Results for unbounded mechanisms (no Q+ constraint).
When the worst-case quality loss is not constrained, the optimal
remapping ensures that all mechanisms are optimal in terms of
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Figure 6: Average error vs. average quality loss
for different bounded mechanisms.
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average error, i.e., PAE = Q (see Fig. 11 in the Appendix). This shows
that the optimal remapping applied to any mechanism achieves an
optimal performance, whether it was Laplacian noise or a binary
selection of a location such as Coin, as we proved in Sect. 3.
Figure 4 shows the mechanisms’ performance in terms of con-
ditional entropy PCE, where the horizontal black line represents
the maximum entropy achievable, i.e., the entropy of the prior π .
Unsurprisingly, ExPost outperforms the rest of the mechanisms, as
it is optimized with respect to this metric. The relative improvement
of ExPost with respect to the other algorithms is slightly better in
Brightkite than in Gowalla. This is due to the fact that in Brightkite
the most frequent PoI is more popular than in Gowalla (see Fig. 3),
and thus performing well in this location is crucial to achieve a
good overall privacy level in Brightkite. The iterative structure of
ExPost allows this mechanism to refine its performance and be
more effective than the rest of the mechanisms around this PoI. We
note, however, that this refinement comes at the price of an increase
in computational cost. Overall, all the mechanisms achieve a similar
performance in terms of conditional entropy, except for the coin,
that performs poorly. This reinforces the critique in Sect. 3.2: even
though Coin is optimal in terms of the average adversary error,
measuring its performance in terms of conditional entropy reveals
its privacy flaws.
Figure 5 shows the mechanisms’ performance in terms of geo-
indistinguishability PGI(f ) (we recall that PGI(f ) = 1/ϵ), only for
Lap, Exp and ExPost, as these are the only algorithms that guaran-
tee this property. As already seen in [6], the Laplace noise outper-
forms the exponential mechanism, and ExPost performs similar to
the latter.
5.1.2 Results for bounded mechanisms. We now impose a worst-
case quality loss constraint of Q+max = 1.5km to the mechanisms
(as a reference, we show a circle of radius 1.5km in Fig. 2). To
implement this constraint in the mechanisms, we truncate their
output at 1.5km and then apply the optimal remapping that respects
the worst-case loss constraint. We do this by solving the problem
in (15) with constraints. We do not evaluate the coin mechanism in
this scenario, since it almost always violates the Q+ constraint.
The results for the average adversary error as Euclidean distance
are shown in Fig. 6. As expected, the mechanisms obtained after the
remapping in this scenario are not necessarily optimal. We see that
ExPost achieves a result that is close to the optimal mechanism
in the unbounded case, while the other mechanisms achieve less
average privacy. We conjecture this is due to the iterative nature
of ExPost, that refines its performance, while the other mecha-
nisms are not optimized regarding the worst-case loss constraint.
Again, ExPost achieves a wider advantage in Brightkite for the
same reason explained above.
Figure 7 shows the performance of the bounded mechanisms in
terms of conditional entropy. The results are similar to those in the
unbounded scenario, with ExPost outperforming the others with
a slightly wider advantage in this case. As bounded mechanisms
do not achieve geo-indistinguishability, we do not evaluate the
performance with respect to this metric in this scenario.
5.2 Discrete scenario
We now consider a simple synthetic scenario and evaluate the
optimal mechanisms obtained following the method by Shokri et. al
[27]. In this work, the authors propose a linear program that finds
a mechanism f inside the polytope of optimal mechanisms for PAE
given a constraint Q, i.e., f ∈ F optQ . This approach is very versatile,
as it can be computed for any pair of distance functions dP (·) and
dQ (·). We set our synthetic scenario under the assumptions of that
work: the input and output alphabets are discrete and identical
X = Z, and the adversary can only estimate locations inside that
same alphabet Xˆ = X. For simplicity, we consider that the set of
locations in X are the centers of the cells that make a 5 × 5 square
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Figure 9: Performance of Shokri et. al’s algorithm optimized for the adversary error in terms of Euclidean distance, compared
to the coin mechanism and exponential posterior mechanism.
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Figure 10: Performance of Shokri et. al’s algorithm optimized for the adversary error in terms of semantic distance, compared
to the coin mechanism and the exponential posterior mechanism.
grid and assign a tag to each location that can be “Home”, “Park”,
“Shop” or “Café”, as depicted in Fig. 8. We consider that the prior
is uniform π (x) = 1/25 , ∀x ∈ X. We measure the point-wise
loss as the Euclidean distance dQ (x , z) = | |x − z | |2 and consider
two point-wise metrics of privacy: the Euclidean distance and a
semantic distance defined as the Hamming distance between tags,
i.e.,dP (x , z) = 0 if Tag(x) = Tag(z), anddP (x , z) = 1 otherwise. This
metric is similar to the semantic metric in [1]. The average error
computed using this distance function represents the probability
that an adversary guesses incorrectly the tag of x .
We evaluate ExPost and Coin together with the optimal mecha-
nism proposed in [27]. For the latter, we solve the linear program
to find optimal mechanisms in terms of maximizing PAE using the
Euclidean distance (Fig. 9) and the semantic distance we defined
(Fig. 10). As expected, the optimalmechanisms (Shokri et. al) achieve
the optimal privacy when evaluated using the adversary’s error for
which they are optimized (Figs. 9a and 10b), but not when evalu-
ated against a different metric (Figs. 9b and 10a). ExPost and Coin
achieve maximum privacy in terms of Euclidean distance, as before,
but not in terms of semantic distance. This example emphasizes
that optimizing a mechanism with respect to a privacy metric may
provide very bad performance with respect to other privacy criteria.
This experiment also shows another important idea: even though
the solutions of the linear program both achieve approximately the
same performance in terms of average error (optimal in Figs. 9a
and 10b, suboptimal in Figs. 9b and 10a), they exhibit a radically
different behavior in terms of conditional entropy. Indeed, using the
mechanism computed with the simplex algorithm (a mechanism at
a vertex of F optQ ), the adversary has much less uncertainty about x
on average than if the user had implemented a mechanism from
the interior of the polytope. This difference in entropy is also what
allows us to tell apart a mechanism such as ExPost from Coin. Note
that the mechanism computed by solving the linear program with
the simplex algorithm performs even worse than the coin in terms
of entropy, illustrating the dangers of optimizing privacy in only
one dimension.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have demonstrated the problems of using a single
privacy metric as indicator of the performance of location privacy
preserving mechanisms. We have proven that there is more than
one optimal protection mechanism in terms of maximizing the av-
erage adversary error for a given average quality loss, and that the
family of mechanisms that fulfill such condition behave differently
in terms of other privacy metrics. Thus, optimizing defenses with
only one privacy metric in mind may lead to mechanisms that offer
poor protection in other dimensions of privacy. To avoid selecting
underperforming mechanisms we propose the use of complemen-
tary criteria to guide the choice. We provide two example auxiliary
metrics: the conditional entropy and the worst-case loss. We pro-
pose an optimal mechanism with respect to the former, and provide
means to implement mechanisms according to the latter.
We evaluate the mechanisms, comparing them to previous work,
on two real datasets. Our experiments confirm two important ideas:
first, that we cannot find a mechanism that performs optimally with
respect to every privacy metric. Second, that even if a mechanism
performs well in a particular metric it does not imply that it is
necessarily beneficial for the user. Our findings reveal the need
to take a step back in mechanism design to integrate privacy as a
multi-dimensional notion, in order to avoid solutions that provide
a false perception of privacy.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
In order to prove this result, first notice that, when dP (·) ≡ dQ (·),
the quality loss Q is an upper bound of privacy PAE:
PAE(f ,π ) =
∫
R2
min
xˆ ∈R2
{∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f (z |x) · dP (x , xˆ)
}
dz
≤
∫
R2
{∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f (z |x) · dQ (x , z)
}
= Q(f ,π ) , (26)
Now, assume that f ′ = f ◦ д, and therefore
z = argmin
z′∈R2
∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f ′(z |x) · dQ (x , z′) . (27)
The optimal adversary estimation of x given z given in (4) can
be written as
xˆ(z) = argmin
xˆ ∈R2
∑
x ∈X
π (x) · f ′(z |x) · dP (x , xˆ) . (28)
We see that since dP (·) ≡ dQ (·) the optimal adversary estimation
is doing nothing, i.e., xˆ(z) = z. This implies that PAE(f ′,π ) =
Q(f ′,π ), and since we have achieved the upper bound on privacy
given in (26), f ′ is optimal.
A.2 Geo-indistinguishability of the posterior
exponential mechanism.
We recall that the geo-indistinguishability guarantee requires the
following condition to be fulfilled (now written for discrete mech-
anisms, where p(z |x) denotes the probability of reporting z when
the original location is x ):
p(z |x) ≤ eϵ ·dP (x,x ′) · p(z |x ′) , ∀x ,x ′ ∈ X, z ∈ Z , (29)
where dP (x ,x ′) is the Euclidean distance.
The last iteration of the ExPost algorithm in 4.1.2 returns a
mechanism that can be written for a particular input x and output
z as
p(z |x) =

PZ (z)·e−b ·dQ (x,z)∑
z′∈Z PZ (z′)·e−b ·dQ (x,z
′) if PZ (z) > 0 ,
0 , if PZ (z) = 0 .
(30)
where dQ (x , z) is the Euclidean distance. In the second case, the
geo-indistinguishability guarantee is trivially achieved since given
any pair of input locations x ,x ′ ∈ X, p(z |x) = p(z |x ′) = 0. For the
first case, we use the triangular inequality dQ (x , z) + dQ (x ′, z) ≥
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Figure 11: Average error vs. average quality loss for different
unbounded mechanisms.
dQ (x ,x ′) to write
p(z |x) = PZ (z) · e
−b ·dQ (x,z)∑
z′∈Z PZ (z′) · e−b ·dQ (x,z′)
(31)
≤PZ (z) · e
b ·dQ (x,x ′) · e−b ·dQ (x ′,z)∑
z′∈Z PZ (z′) · e−b ·dQ (x,z′)
(32)
≤ PZ (z) · e
b ·dQ (x,x ′) · e−b ·dQ (x ′,z)∑
z′∈Z PZ (z′) · e−b ·dQ (x,x ′) · e−b ·dQ (x ′,z′)
(33)
=
PZ (z) · e−b ·dQ (x ′,z)∑
z′∈Z PZ (z′) · e−b ·dQ (x ′,z′)
· e2b ·dQ (x,x ′) (34)
=e2b ·dQ (x,x ′) · p(z |x ′) , (35)
which satisfies the geo-indistinguishability for ϵ = 2b or PGI = 1/2b,
if dQ (·) is the Euclidean distance. This concludes the proof.
A.3 Performance of the unbounded
mechanisms in terms of the average error
When the average error (Euclidean) and the average quality loss
(Euclidean) are used to evaluate the performance of the mechanisms
described in Section 5, we achieve the trivial result PAE = Q. This
is shown in Fig. 11 for completeness.
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